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Abstract
How do changes in the market architecture aﬀect the dynamics of deregulated elec-
tricity prices? We investigate this issue in the context of the Italian Power Exchange
(IPEX), using data on the daily average day-ahead price (PUN) between April 2004 and
December 2008.
Estimates of baseline time series models (ARMAX and ARMAX-EGARCH) and
their forecasting performances suggest that the trend in natural gas prices, determin-
istic weekly patterns, the impact of perceived temperatures, persistence in conditional
volatility and the inverse leverage eﬀect are essential features of the PUN dynamics.
We then augment the best-performing models with dummies that account for changes
in the market architecture, such as the introduction of contracts for diﬀerences (CfDs) to
support renewables, trading of white certiﬁcates for energy eﬃciency, and the demand-
side liberalization. The ﬁndings show that changes in the market architecture have only
aﬀected the PUN volatility. Speciﬁcally, CfDs have mitigated volatility, while white
certiﬁcates and demand liberalization have increased it. Moreover, after controlling for
reforms the inverse leverage eﬀect vanishes, and the persistence in volatility is lower than
in the baseline estimates.
Keywords: Electricity prices, Italian Power Exchange, Market architecture, ARMA,
EGARCH.
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11 Introduction
The simple picture drawn by uniform price auctions - the crossing of demand and supply
curves, so reminescent of Economics 101 classes - is nothing but a piece in a much broader
and complex mosaic: the architecture of restructured wholesale power sectors. As Glachant
(2009) put it,
what we refer to as “the” wholesale electricity market in fact consists of several
complementary modules that trigger a sequence of operations as required for sat-
isfying the claims on the commodity.
Over time, the existing “modules” undergo gradual and radical transformations, and new
modules are added to the overall architecture. Often this happens in response to new policy
challenges - such as climate change and energy security - that are increasingly met by policy-
makers by means of Coasian mechanisms, in line with the “marketization” of the public
intervention in the formerly integrated infrastructure industries.
A common working hypothesis in the electricity markets literature is that changes in the
details of the industry architecture will cause the dynamics of the two market curves to change,
perhaps radically. The main challenge for economic researchers, however, is to understand
whether those changes drive the market closer to the desired policy goals. The literature
on forward trading, for instance, has underlined how electricity forwards may cause power
generating companies to play more competitively in the spot market, but it may also facilitate
the enforcement of collusive behaviors, discourage entry and investments in new capacity.
Exposing end users to power price ﬂuctuations may mitigate market power by increasing the
short-run price-elasticity of demand, but this might be very conditional on the diﬀusion of
metering technologies. Tradable white certiﬁcates for energy eﬃciency are expected to reduce
the national energy consumption and the dependence on the imports of fossil fuels, thereby
yielding lower power prices, but these beneﬁts may be oﬀset by the rebound eﬀect. With
respect to these relevant policy issues, we can take the Italian electricity industry as a testing
ground, as a number of related changes in its architecture have occurred since the Italian
Power Exchange (Ipex) was launched in April 2004.
In the paper, we estimate time series models of the average daily day-ahead system marginal
prices quoted on the Ipex (the so-called Prezzo Unico Nazionale, or PUN) between April 1,
2004 and December 31, 2008. We use ARMAX and GARCH models to match the observed
time series properties, such as seasonals and volatility clustering. We show that an ARMAX-
EGARCH model featuring natural gas prices, deterministic weekly patterns, perceived tem-
peratures, persistence in conditional volatility and the inverse leverage eﬀect provides the most
satisfactory forecasting performance.
Such a baseline model is then augmented with dummy variables that account for three main
changes in the architecture of the Italian power exchange: (i) the introduction of Contracts-
for-Diﬀerences (CfDs) to support renewables, (ii) the status of eligible customers extended
to residential customers, and (iii) the opening of a market for white certiﬁcates. The main
ﬁnding is that changes in the market architecture have only aﬀected the PUN volatility.
Speciﬁcally, CfDs have mitigated volatility, while white certiﬁcates and demand liberalization
have increased it. Moreover, after controlling for reforms the inverse leverage eﬀect vanishes,
and the volatility persistence is lower than in the baseline estimates.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper addressing the eﬀects of changes in the Italian
power market architecture. Some previous works estimated market power indicators using
2plant-level data (Bollino and Polinori 2008b, Baselice 2007), an issue touched upon also in the
papers by Floro (2009) and Perekhodtsev and Baselice (2009), wherein individual oﬀer data
are used to evaluate oligopoly models. Issues concerning the transmission system are analyzed
in the paper by Bollino and Polinori (2008a), who investigate contagion eﬀects between zonal
markets, and in Gianfreda and Grossi (2009), who ﬁt fractionally-integrated Reg-ARFIMA
models to zonal prices. Boﬀa, Pingali and Vannoni (2009) estimate the welfare gains from
increased interconnection among Italian market zones. Finally, Bosco, Parisio and Pelagatti
(2007) show that a periodic ARMA-GARCH model outperforms periodic ARMA models in
terms of predictive power.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the Italian power industry,
the main changes in its market architecture and their expected impacts on day-ahead prices.
Section 3 oﬀers a preliminary anaysis of the data. Section 4 illustrates the baseline time
series models, whose estimates are in Section 5. Section 6 reports the estimates obtained after
including dummies that account for CfDs, demand-side liberalization and white certiﬁcates.
Conclusions and insights for future research are outlined in Section 7.
2 The Italian wholesale electricity market
Thirty-seven years after the nationalization of the Italian electricity industry, the Legislative
Decree 79/1999 (also known as Bersani decree) re-introduced market-based governance in the
power generation segment of the industry, in application of the European Directive 96/92/EC
on the creation of the Internal Electricity Market (Ferrari and Giulietti 2005, Floro 2009).
The former State-owned vertically-integrated monopolist, Enel, was required to unbundle its
generation and distribution activities, and the management of the grid was entrusted to a
newly-formed, state-owned transmission system operator (GRTN until October 2005, Terna
afterwards). Regulatory oversight of the liberalized electricity industry is responsibility of
the Italian Electricity and Gas Authority. The restructuring process culminated with the
inauguration of the Italian Power Exchange (Ipex) in April 2004. Ipex, run by Gestore del
Mercato Elettrico (GME), takes care of trading in the day-ahead and adjustment markets, up
to gate closure, i.e. one hour prior to delivery. The reserves and balancing markets are under
the responsibility of the transmission system operator.
The day-ahead market works as a periodic multi-unit uniform price auction. GME uses a
merit order principle to construct the aggregate supply and demand curves. If the resulting
ﬂows on the grid violate the transmission constraints, the market is split into diﬀerent zones.1
Power generating companies in that case receive the zonal prices, whereas buyers pay the
Prezzo Unico Nazionale (PUN), or single national price, that is an average of the zonal prices
weighted by the zonal electricity consumption levels.
On the demand side, Italy has adopted a single-buyer system: the single buyer Acquirente
Unico, a state-owned company, buys electricity from the power exchange and sell it to distri-
bution and retail companies, for them to supply captive (non-eligible) customers and those
eligible customers who have not switched to competitive suppliers.2 The thresholds for eligi-
bility have been lowered over time, and as explained in more detail later, residential customers
1Namely: North, Centre North, Centre South, South, Calabria (merged with the South zone in 2009),
Sicily and Sardinia - plus foreign virtual zones, i.e. interconnection points with neighbouring countries, and
constrained production poles.
2Acquirente Unico cannot make more than 25% of its purchases through bilateral contracts. The selling
price is determined by law as a markup on costs, and is revised periodically.
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The time evolution of the day-ahead market is outlined in Table 1.3 The Ipex day-ahead
market is the second largest in Europe with 233 TWh power traded in 2008 - the ﬁrst being
the Scandinavian NordPool.4 Traded volumes peak in January and July, due to heating and
cooling needs respectively. About 69% of total power trading in Italy occurs through the power
exchange (including day-ahead and adjustment markets); the remaining power is traded over
the counter via bilateral contracts. Average annual prices have been growing steadily from
about 59 Euros/MWh in 2005 to about 87 Euros/MWh in 2008, while no clear pattern can
be identiﬁed in the price volatility, proxied by the coeﬃcient of variation (standard deviation
normalized by the mean).
[Table 1 here]
The day-ahead Italian electricity market has witnessed increasing participation from both
the demand and supply sides: the number of operators with bids has grown by one-third
between 2005 and 2009, whereas the number of operators with oﬀers has doubled. Corre-
spondingly, Enel has been slowly losing its dominance, since its market share fell from 38%
to 31% in the time window under analysis. On the demand side, it is also worth noting that
the share of power acquired by the single-buyer has halved within four years, as more power
customers have been awarded eligibility over time. The Italian supply stack is dominated by
natural gas plants, which sold around 50% of the power traded in the Ipex day-ahead market.
The weight of natural gas in the fuel mix has been growing over time, while other prominent
sources, such as coal, oil and hydropower, have receded.
2.1 Changes in the Italian power market architecture
The Italian power exchange has undergone a number of changes in its architecture across
time, such as the introduction of Contracts for Diﬀerences (CfDs) to support renewables
and to hedge the position of the single buyer (January 1, 2005); the implementation of the
Tradable White Certiﬁcates (TWC) scheme for energy eﬃciency, or white certiﬁcates (March
7, 2006); and the full demand-side liberalization (July 1, 2007). Assessing the impact of such
reforms on the day-ahead prices is a way to obtain more general insights on how changes in
market architecture aﬀect the wholesale electricity market dynamics. Let us brieﬂy describe
the mentioned reforms and their expected impacts on the day-ahead price dynamics, drawing
on the existing economics literature.
Contracts for diﬀerences. Since 1992, power produced using renewables is subsidized.
During 2004, such power was bought by the transmission system operator at an administered
price, and sold to eligible customers through bilateral contracts. Starting January 1, 2005,
the system operator was required to sell the subsidized power on the power exchange, and the
ensuing price risk was hedged by means of contracts for diﬀerences (CfDs). A similar hedging
strategy was implemented by Acquirente Unico, who is obliged by law to hedge against price
and volumetric risks.5
CfDs resemble ﬁnancially-settled forwards (Deng and Oren 2006) and their eﬀects on the
PX price have been extensively studied, as they accounted for 80 to 90% of the initial port-
3All tables and plots are available in the Appendix.
4See Fig. 3.2 in the GME 2008 Report.
5See Fraser and Lanza (2006) for a description of the CfDs subscribed by Acquirente Unico in 2005.
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theoretical point of view, early studies (Allaz and Vila 1993, Powell 1993) found that when
oligopolistic ﬁrms take short forward positions, they ﬁnd it optimal to play more competi-
tively on the spot market, because forward trading shifts the spot marginal revenue curve
outwards. Later theoretical works have shown that forwards may in fact enhance spot mar-
ket power, as they may facilitate the enforcement of collusive agreements (Liski and Montero
2006, Green and Le Coq 2009), deter entry (Newbery 1998, Lien 2000), and discourage the
investments in new capacity (Murphy and Smeers 2007a, 2007b, Adilov 2006). However, such
anti-competitive eﬀects are more likely to show up in a long-term empirical study than in our
daily-frequency sample. While the econometric literature on the eﬀects of CfDs is sparse and
methodologically weak (Helm and Powell 1992, Gray et al. 1996, Lowrey 1997), laboratory ex-
periments show that forwards help curtailing market power (Le Coq and Orzen 2006, Brandts
et al. 2008, Ferreira et al. 2009).
In addition, CfDs may aﬀect the wholesale price volatility. Sapio (2009) shows that volatil-
ity is mitigated by forward trading in an Allaz-Vila model with risk-neutral agents. To under-
stand why, suppose demand is predicted to grow. Generating companies will ﬁnd it optimal
to increase their forward trading, but the ensuing increase in the spot marginal revenues leads
to increasing spot sales too - oﬀsetting the price growth which would occur without forwards.
For the same reason, the spot price does not fall as much when demand is expected to de-
cline. Overall, the support of the spot price distribution will be narrower. In a model with
risk-averse customers, Robinson and Baniak (2002) show that CfDs could actually increase
volatility, because by making the market more volatile, power generating companies can stim-
ulate the demand for hedging and proﬁt from increased forward premia. This perspective is
particularly interesting for Italy, as hedging by Acquirente Unico is compulsory - in a sense,
the single buyer is “institutionally” risk-averse.
Demand-side liberalization. Since July 2007, the deﬁnition of eligible customers in-
cludes residential energy users; therefore households are free to choose their power seller and
their supply contract. This amounts to exposing to competition, potentially, 85 TWh of con-
sumption per year, 22 million families and 5 million of other users, namely 77% of the clients
and 30% of total electricity consumption in Italy. In principle, exposing ﬁnal customers to
wholesale price ﬂuctuations would enhance the short-term price-elasticity of demand, therefore
eroding the mark-ups set by oligopolistic power generating companies. Demand responsiveness
may however be hampered by informational opacity and switching costs. A statistical survey
of the Italian residential energy users, run by Nielsen-Bip in June 2009, reveals that 31% of the
responders were not informed about the liberalization, therefore unaware of the opportunities
to switch.7 Among the informed customers, only about 36% are willing to change their power
supplier. Such evidence is consistent with the data on customer switching rates reported by
the market operator, which are not encouraging (see GME 2007, 2008). The customers who
are not willing to switch claim that collecting and processing the relevant information is too
costly. Interestingly, they also perceive that switching among providers would not allow any
substantial saving. Nevertheless, in his international overview of the retail market perfor-
mances, Glachant (2006) underlines how market concentration and barriers to entry can be
very high even several years after the liberalization of retail trading. All this given, we expect
that the average prices after demand liberalization will not be lower.8 What is more, the
6While Italian CfDs are aimed to support renewables, British CfDs in the early Nineties were designed to
limit redundancies in the coal industry. For a detailed account, see Green (1999).
7The survey covered a sample of 25000 individuals, corresponding to about 9000 Italian households.
8To the extent that forward contracts help curtailing market power, demand-side liberalization and compe-
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may engage in trial-and-error learning processes which may de-stabilize the market.
White certiﬁcates. A market for white certiﬁcates (“Titoli di Eﬃcienza Energetica” or
TEE) has been launched by GME in March 2006. Obliged parties are the distributors of gas
and electricity with more than 100,000 customers (decreased to 50,000 in 2007), who meet
their targets by assisting their customers to take energy-eﬃciency measures in residential and
commercial buildings. Energy distributors have to generate a given quantity of energy savings
or, if they fall short of their target, to buy certiﬁcates from other suppliers. Conversely, distrib-
utors who have funded more measures than their target are allowed to sell white certiﬁcates
to those who are short of their target.9
In principle, white certiﬁcates could signiﬁcantly improve energy eﬃciency and decrease
the dependence on imports of fossil fuels (see the MARKAL simulations by Mundaca 2008).
Energy demand is expected to decrease, pushing the wholesale electricity price down - unless
the rebound eﬀect is strong enough (see Brookes 2000 and references therein on the Khazzoom-
Brookes postulate). An example of a rebound eﬀect has been studied by Giraudet and Quirion
(2008), who have shown that when the energy eﬃciency target is set as proportional to the
power distributed, the marginal costs for energy distributors increase whenever they need to
generate more certiﬁcates. This would decrease the optimal electricity supply, partly or wholly
oﬀsetting the price reduction brought about by energy savings.
Which eﬀects should we expect on average electricity prices and volatility? The evidence so
far reveals that although the Italian targets were largely exceeded, during the ﬁrst year about
90% of TEEs were apportioned to Enel-owned distribution companies, leading to weak com-
petitive pressure and little incentives to reduce costs (Mundaca 2008). Moreover, distributors
showed a high propensity to meet the energy eﬃciency requirements by buying certiﬁcates,
rather than by investing in more energy-saving technologies (GME 2007, Mundaca et al. 2008).
The hoped-for decrease of energy demand may not have occurred. As to possible volatility
eﬀects, it is worth noting that the TEE market has been quite active: on average, about 24%
of the certiﬁcates delivered have been traded. The increased TEE market liquidity and the
propensity to meet the targets by trading might suggest that speculative trading was at work.
Some volatility transmission from the TEE market to the PX might have occurred. For the
above reasons, we expect white certiﬁcates to have left average price levels unaﬀected and
perhaps increased volatility.
3 Preliminary data analysis
We have collected data on the Prezzo Unico Nazionale (PUN), the day-ahead system marginal
buy price quoted on the Italian power exchange. The PUN data are publicly available on the
IPEX website (www.mercatoelettrico.org) and include 24 observations per day, as each
day 24 sealed-bid uniform price auctions determine the prices for each hour of the following
day. Our sample begins with the prices quoted on April 1st, 2004 and ends on December 31st,
tition among retailers might even increase the wholesale price, as they would reduce the incentives for retailers
to enter into long-term contracts. According to Green (2003), if the retail market is liberalized, few retailers
are ready to sign long-term contracts, because doing so entails the risk that rivals will undercut them as soon
as a short-term fall in wholesale prices occurs.
9The Italian target for the 2005-2009 period was set to an aggregate energy saving of 21 TWh/year (2005-
2009), corresponding to 1.5% of ﬁnal energy consumption.
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[Fig. 1 here]
The whole dataset includes 41665 hourly prices. Because the prices for all 24 hours of day
t are jointly set on day t − 1, the whole sample cannot be seen as a time series. Rather, we
analyze the time series of daily arithmetic average prices, yielding 1736 observations.11 Fig. 1
displays the time evolution of IPEX prices. The series seems to be driven by an upward trend,
leading the price to increase by about 50% in less than 5 years. One can also quite neatly
distinguish regular patterns at a high (presumably weekly) frequency, and broader within-year
ﬂuctuations. The series is characterized by sharp and short-lived spikes - e.g. a noteworthy
one in July 2006 - but these seem to occur less frequently than in other power exchanges.
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the sample data, along with the values of some
test statistics. Both the D’Agostino-Pearson and the Shapiro-Wilk tests cannot reject the null
hypothesis of normality at standard signiﬁcance levels.12 Normality is likely to be an outcome
of taking daily averages: indeed, if we analyze the time series of the 24 hourly auctions
separately, we do ﬁnd asymmetries and long tails.
The autocorrelogram depicted in Fig. 2 shows that the serial correlation of Ipex prices
decays rather slowly and has local maxima at lags multiples of 7 days, much alike in other
power exchanges. We have run a Ljung-Box portmanteau test using 7 lags (corresponding to
one week) and as expected, the null of zero serial correlation is rejected at the 99% signiﬁcance
level.
[Fig. 2 here]
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests are performed
in order to assess whether the trend spotted by eye-balling of Fig. 1 is a deterministic or
a stochastic one. The test speciﬁcations include a constant and a trend; in the ADF test
there are 7 lags of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced prices, according to the optimal lag criterion suggested
by Gordon (1995),13 whereas the PP test considers 7 lags when computing the Newey-West-
adjusted standard errors. In both cases, the null of unit roots is rejected: the ADF test statistic
is -5.389, well below the 1% critical value (-3.960), and the PP test statistic equals -20.095
versus a 1% critical value of -3.43. Therefore, with a high probability the IPEX price series
is covariance-stationary around a linear trend. These results are in line with most previous
research on electricity prices.14 Based on test results, estimation can be carried out using
10The early days of a market are typically characterized by adjustments that could in principle lead to
abnormal price behaviors. However, the results to be presented are robust to cutting the ﬁrst few months out
of the sample.
11Alternatively, one could study the series of hour-h prices, h = 1,...,24, separately, as in Bottazzi, Sapio and
Secchi (2005) and Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2004), or apply the periodic ARMA approach (Carnero, Koopman
and Ooms 2007, Bosco, Parisio and Pelagatti 2007).
12The D’Agostino-Pearson and Shapiro-Wilk tests are considered the most powerful among normality tests
(see D’Agostino et al. 1990).
13The criterion requires to pick the lag that maximizes the autocorrelation function for the ﬁrst diﬀerenced
price series.
14Unit roots have been found only by Helm and Powell (1992) on England & Wales pool prices, and by
DeVany and Walls (1999) and Serletis and Herbert (1999) on US data.
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the evidence of Gaussian and covariance-stationary prices.15
As a matter of fact, the linear trend may be nothing but a proxy for the underlying trend
in fundamentals, such as fuel prices. Fig. 3, depicting the time series of natural gas prices,
seems to conﬁrm this intuition. Nevertheless, the correlation between gas prices and a linear
trend is as high as 0.911. One may therefore envisage the PUN series as covariance-stationary
around an upward-trending natural gas price.
[Fig. 3 here]
4 The baseline models
In this section we sketch the baseline time series models estimated in the paper. Our goal
here is to uncover the basic features of the Italian power exchange, concerning the structure of
demand and supply and the eﬃciency of the market mechanism, and we do so in the context
of autoregressive-moving average models with and without conditional heteroskedasticity (see
Knittel and Roberts 2005 for a similar approach; Bunn 2004, Weron 2006 and references
therein for further applications). In Section 6 we will assess the impact of market design
reforms by augmenting the baseline models presented here.
We begin with a simple mean-reverting process in discrete time, or ARX(1) (Model 1):
(1 − βL)pt = α + ρgt + σt (1)
where pt denotes the market-clearing price at time t, gt is the natural gas price, t ∼
iidN(0,1), L is the lag operator, β, ρ and σ are constant coeﬃcients. β = 1 would suggest
random walk dynamics in the Italian power prices, showing that changes in the price are
essentially random, whereas β < 1 would be evidence of mean-reversion.
Because weekly patterns in electricity consumption appear to be important, Model 2 adds
stochastic weekly eﬀects as 7-day lags in the AR and MA components, yielding an AR-
MAX(7,7) process:
(1 − β1L − β7L
7)pt = α + ρgt + (1 − δ1L − δ7L
7)σt (2)
We expect to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant estimates of β7, which is the coeﬃcient tuning
the serial correlation in prices over a 7-days horizon. However, the weekly patterns in power
prices may be of a deterministic nature, and so for seasonal patterns. We control for this in
Model 3, including daily and monthly dummies. The speciﬁcation is
(1 − β1L − β7L
7)pt = αt + ρgt + (1 − δ1L − δ7L
7)σt (3)
with the time-varying intercept




15Because of the evidence of a Gaussian price distribution, there is no need to treat outliers, as often required
in the time series modelling of electricity prices (see Clewlow and Strickland 2000; Tru¨ ck, Weron and Wolﬀ
2007).
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sat, feb, mar, apr, may, jun, jul, aug, sep, oct, nov, dec }, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, the
default value for the intercept (α) delivers the conditional average power price for a Sunday in
January.16 If the weekly pattern is deterministic, adding daily dummies will cause the point
estimate of β7 to decrease.
More insights on the structure of demand can be obtained by acknowledging that in a
highly liquid market such as the Ipex, household consumption for heating and cooling needs
accounts for a signiﬁcant share of power demand. Model 4 augments Model 3 by including
the Heat Index (HI) deﬁned in the meteorological literature by Steadman (1979):17
(1 − β1L − β7L




t + (1 − δ1L − δ7L
7)σt (5)
The HI is calculated using temperature and humidity data, and as such it takes account
of the impact of humidity on perceived temperatures. What we call here HI is actually the
median of the heat indexes computed using weather data for the largest Italian cities (Rome,
Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo, Genoa; data source: http://www.wunderground.com). The
PX price-weather relationship is likely to be non-linear: power demand is typically high both
during the summer and during the winter, respectively because of cooling and heating needs,
but lower in the milder seasons. Accordingly, we also include the second and third powers of
HI, as in Knittel and Roberts (2005).
Finally, there are convincing reasons to expect time-varying and clustered volatility in
power exchanges. It is a largely shared proposition that volatility and jumps in power exhanges
are mainly due to convexity of the supply stack coupled with random ﬂuctuations of an
inelastic demand (e.g. Barlow 2002, Simonsen 2005, Lucheroni 2009). It has been shown
that in a uniform price auction environment, companies owning several generating units may
have incentives to ask competitive prices on their most eﬃcient units - making sure that they
run - and prices well above marginal costs on their most expensive units - so as to increase
the chances that the system marginal price will be very high (see Ausubel and Cramton
1996). Such a positive externality across units may justify the use of “hockey-stick” supply
functions. Interestingly, a recent paper by Kanamura (2009) shows that if demand is driven
by a random walk and if supply is non-linear (convex or concave), one observes an asymmetric
volatility response to market shocks. An appropriate tool to test for persistent and asymmetric
heteroskedasticity is given by Model 5, an ARMAX-EGARCH model (Nelson 1991):
(1 − β1L − β7L




t + (1 − δ1L − δ7L
7)σtt (6)
where volatility is driven by the following process:
log(σ
2




h(zs) = ψzs + |zs| − E[|zs|] (8)
16Alternatively, we could have used sinusoidal functions as proxies for the seasonal and weekly eﬀects, but
because power demand varies in quite an asymmetric fashion across the week and the year, dummies are more
precise proxies.
17We actually rely on the HI formulation derived by Rothfusz (1990), whose coeﬃcients were estimated by
means of a multiple regression analysis using the data from Steadman’s paper.
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ARCH(7) coeﬃcients, γ is the GARCH(1) coeﬃcient, and ψ tunes the degree of asymmetry in
the variance response to innovations. Previous research on PX prices found ψ > 0 (see Knit-
tel and Roberts 2005, Bowden and Payne 2008), meaning that positive innovations increase
volatility more than the negative ones - the so-called inverse leverage eﬀect, as opposed to the
leverage eﬀect detected in ﬁnancial markets. Similar evidence was found by Hadsell, Marathe
and Shawky (2004) by means of a Threshold ARCH model.18
5 Baseline results
The foregoing models have been estimated via conditional maximum likelihood on the whole
sample (Apr 1, 2004 - Dec 31, 2008). The estimates are displayed in Table 3.
[Table 3 here]
The coeﬃcients of the mean-reverting process (Model 1) are all signiﬁcant at the 99%
level. The ﬁrst-order autoregressive coeﬃcient is equal to 0.355, below the unit-root value
of 1, conﬁrming the covariance-stationarity previously assessed by means of unit root tests
- albeit around upward-trending gas prices. A unit increase in the gas price yields a 0.574
increase in the power price, all else being given.
The time-varying mean process estimates (Model 2) show that part of the ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation detected in the simple mean-reverting process can be accounted for by a stochastic
weekly pattern. Indeed, the ﬁrst-order autoregressive coeﬃcient is now 0.042, as compared
with an AR(7) coeﬃcient as high as 0.808. Moreover, the gas price coeﬃcient is now much
lower (0.13), and the standard deviation of the error term falls from 10.829 to 7.75. All these
coeﬃcients are strongly statistically signiﬁcant (99% level).
Including daily and monthly dummies (Model 3) shows that the 7-days autocorrelation is
mainly due to a deterministic pattern of economic activity across the week. Indeed, the AR(7)
coeﬃcient drops from 0.808 to 0.094, whereas daily dummies are all positive and signiﬁcant,
with the only exception of the Saturday dummy. The coeﬃcients to the monthly dummies
suggest that prices in February, June and July are as high as in January, the default month (the
corresponding estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant); lower prices are observed in spring
and fall months (negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients). The estimated standard deviation of
the error terms falls again to 6.854.
Model 4 includes the Heat Index (HI) and its second and third powers. The HI coeﬃcients
are all positive and signiﬁcant. This conﬁrms the intuition that the price-weather relationship
is a non-linear one, and its increasing shape reveals that the electricity demand for cooling
prevails on the use of electrical heating facilities. As it could be expected, the monthly dummies
coeﬃcients are now smaller in magnitude, and some of them lose signiﬁcance (speciﬁcally,
May, September, October and November). The remaining coeﬃcient estimates are roughly
unaﬀected.
Finally, the ARMAX-EGARCH process (Model 5) provides a more detailed description of
the time dependencies in the conditional volatility, while broadly conﬁrming the estimates of
the mean equation. More precisely, one detects positive and strongly signiﬁcant ARCH and
GARCH eﬀects, suggesting that volatility is highly persistent (γ, the GARCH coeﬃcient, is
18We have also attempted to estimate a jump-diﬀusion model, using the Ball and Torous (1983) approxi-
mation. However, the estimated jump probability is too large for the approximation to be valid.
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Andrea Petrella and Sandro Sapioequal to 0.749). In line with the previous literature cited in Section 4, we detect an inverse
leverage eﬀect, with ψ equal to 0.151 and 99% signiﬁcant: positive shocks seem to increase
volatility more than negative shocks.
The forecasting performances of the above models have been evaluated over 1 week, 1
month, 3 months and 6 months horizons using the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and
Median Absolute Deviation (MAE) criteria. For the sake of robustness, we have generated
forecasts based on rolling samples of 1370 observations each (ﬁrst sample: Apr 1, 2004 -
Dec 31, 2007; last sample: Sep 30, 2004 - Jun 30, 2008), using a 7-days step rule, totalling
27 samples. Average RMSE and MAE values and their variances across rolling samples are
reported in Table 4 for each model and for each time horizon.
[Table 4 here]
Comparing the models from the forecasting viewpoint reveals that the EGARCH (model
5) outperforms all other models: its average RMSE and MAE is lower on all forecasting
horizons. The ARMAX model with the heat index (model 4) is the second best model,
followed by the ARMAX with daily dummies (model 3), the ARMAX without daily dummies
(model 2) and the simple ARX(1) (model 1). This ranking ﬁnds an exception on the weekly
forecasting horizon, when model 2 outperforms model 4. The variances of the RMSE and
MAE indicators across rolling samples are quite high for the 7-days and monthly horizons,
suggesting that the EGARCH may not have been the best-forecasting model along the whole
history of the market. The outlined ranking seems to be more robust on the 3- and 6-months
forecasting horizons, where variances are considerably smaller. The bottom line is that models
including deterministic weekly patterns and non-linear weather and volatility eﬀects are able
to capture some of the essential drivers of the IPEX price dynamics, which purely stochastic
and homoskedastic models are unable to reproduce.
6 The eﬀects of a changing market architecture
The econometric analysis performed thus far implicitly assumes that all PUN observations
are outcomes of the same data generating process. This amounts to assume that the market
has been functioning within a rather stable market architecture, a patently false assumption
in light of the reforms occurred between 2005 and 2007. We therefore amend the baseline
models by including information on the changes in the market architecture in a simple way:
we append some dummies to both the mean and variance equations of the models estimated
in Section 5 and we re-estimate them. We focus in particular on models 3, 4, 5 (ARMAX with
and without weather, and the ARMAX-EGARCH model), which provided the best forecasting
performances, and rename them Models 3’, 4’, 5’. The dummies are dcfd = 1 from 1 January
2005 on; dtwc = 1 from 7 March 2006 on; dlib = 1 from 1 July 2007 on. In the case of white
certiﬁcates, we could have used the time series of their prices and volumes, which are available
on the GME website. However, white certiﬁcate trading sessions occur at the frequency of
three sessions per week, yielding a time series which is not easy to reconcile with daily PUN
data. Moreover, the eﬀects of incentives for energy eﬃciency will not show up on a daily time-
scale, as they require gradual adjustments that take time. By using dummies we manage to
perform a comparison between the PX price distributions, conditional on all other covariates,
before and after the institutional changes. In a sense, we are interested in detecting average
eﬀects over a rather long time-span, and dummies are enough for this purpose.
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architecture have signiﬁcantly aﬀected the conditional volatility of the Ipex day-ahead prices,
but not its conditional mean. A few more detailed remarks are in order.
[Table 5 here]
Concerning the mean equation estimates, the dummies for white certiﬁcates and demand-
side liberalization enter the time series models with positive signs, but the coeﬃcients are never
statistically signiﬁcant, except for white certiﬁcates, signiﬁcant in the ARMAX model with HI
(Model 4’). The coeﬃcients for CfDs are not signiﬁcant, and their signs, which are negative
in Models 3’ and 4’, turns to positive in Model 5’. At the same time, the autoregressive and
moving average structure, the deterministic weekly pattern and the inﬂuence of gas prices
and weather are robust to controlling for changes in market architecture; only the seasonal
pattern is partly modiﬁed. Therefore the average behavior of the PUN is broadly unaﬀected
by changes in market architecture.
When it comes to the conditional volatility, the outlook is diﬀerent. CfDs seem to have
mitigated the PUN variance both in the ARMAX and in the ARMAX-EGARCH models,
as testiﬁed by the corresponding dummy coeﬃcients - negative and signiﬁcant. On the con-
trary, the signs of white certiﬁcates and liberalization dummies are positive and signiﬁcant,
suggesting that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of CfDs may have been at least partly oﬀset by those
reforms. Indeed, in all models the sum of the TWC and liberalization coeﬃcients attached to
the conditional variance is higher than the CfD coeﬃcient in absolute terms (3.157 vs. -2.47
in Model 3’, 3.073 vs. -2.606 in Model 4’, 0.585 vs. -0.52 in Model 5’).
An interesting eﬀect of changes in the market architecture relates to the dynamic struc-
ture of conditional volatility. As compared to the estimates of the basic models discussed
in Section 5, in the new ARMAX-EGARCH estimates the GARCH coeﬃcient drops from
0.749 to 0.423, while the ARCH coeﬃcients slightly increase (ARCH(1) from 0.397 to 0.437,
and ARCH(7) from 0.154 to 0.199). Also, the asymmetry coeﬃcient ψ turns negative and
loses its signiﬁcance. We can therefore conclude that changes in the market architecture are
partly responsible for the persistence and asymmetry in the dynamics of the PUN conditional
volatility observed in the baseline estimates.
The forecasting performances of the models including the dummies for CfDs, white cer-
tiﬁcates and demand-side liberalization are compared in Table 6. Average MAE and RMSE
suggest that the EGARCH model is the best on the short term forecasting horizons, but it is
slightly outperformed by the ARMA model with heat index on longer horizons. Overall, the
average forecasting performances are worse than in the baseline model; but the average values
hide the fact that MAE and RMSE experience a decreasing trend in MAE and RMSE across
rolling samples - higher than in the baseline model in the early samples, lower in the later
samples.19 This is not surprising: in early samples (i.e. Apr 2004-Dec 2007, May 2004-Jan
2008 and so on) the number of pre-reform observations is relatively higher, so that parameter
estimates reﬂect decisions made by agents during the spring and summer of 2004, when the
eﬀects of the reforms were hard to predict.
[Table 6 here]
19Further details on this issue can be provided by the authors upon request.
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How do changes in the architecture of restructured electricity markets aﬀect the dynamics
of electricity prices? This paper is an attempt to answer to this relevant question. Upon
estimating time series models of the average daily day-ahead system marginal prices quoted
on the Ipex, we have shown that changes in the market architecture have only aﬀected the price
volatility. Speciﬁcally, CfDs have stabilized the market, while white certiﬁcates and demand
liberalization have increased its turbulence, perhaps oﬀsetting the beneﬁcial eﬀects of CfDs.
Moreover, controlling for institutional changes suggests that phenomena often detected in the
empirical literature, such as the inverse leverage eﬀect and volatility persistence, may be partly
due to the very evolution of the market architecture. By appealing to the received theoretical
literature, we may identify a number of policy issues worthy of further investigation.
First, while policy-makers introduced CfDs with the goal of encouraging electricity pro-
duction from renewables sources, the detected volatility mitigation eﬀect appears as a sort of
positive externality for all market participants who are not hedged. The relationship between
electricity derivatives and spot market volatility is surely an under-studied issue, with only a
couple of exceptions (Robinson and Baniak 2002, Sapio 2009). As a matter of fact, Robinson
and Baniak’s (2002) analysis predicts that CfDs would increase volatility, because with risk-
averse customers, power generating companies may increase their forward premia by making
the market more volatile. But when it comes to the Italian PX, this argument fails despite the
fact that the single buyer is obliged to hedge against price risk (see Fraser and Lanza 2006).
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to devote more eﬀorts on the theoretical mechanism be-
hind this result. Also, more evidence is bound to be available in the coming years, as two
Italian forward markets have been inaugurated in November 2008: a physical forward market,
MTE (Mercato a Termine Elettrico) and a market for ﬁnancial futures (IDEX).
Second, with respect to the demand-side liberalization of the market, the results are not
encouraging. One may subscribe to the view that no institutional arrangement will overcome
the intrinsic limitations in demand responsiveness. A more positive take on this issue would
be to encourage policy-makers to adopt more incisive measures towards the diﬀusion of me-
tering technologies and of information on the switching opportunities. Relatedly, the weak
competitive pressure that characterizes the Italian power market may be behind the poor
eﬀects of white certiﬁcates; perhaps the incentives for distributions companies to implement
energy eﬃciency projects are not properly designed.
Let us conclude with a few thoughts on future research. As revealed by volatility estimates,
our results casts doubts on the robustness and on the economic interpretation of the inverse
leverage eﬀect. Our results suggest that the inverse leverage eﬀect only shows up if we fail
to take care of the changing architecture. We wonder whether the eﬀect detected in previous
papers (Hadsell, Marathe and Shawhy 2004, Knittel and Roberts 2005, Bowden and Payne
2008) would survive to controlling for institutional change. Perhaps market clearing tends to
occur in a roughly linear branch of the market supply curve, but the slope of the curve itself
has evolved after the reforms.
Finally, the robustness of the results may be assessed by means of more sophisticated
methodologies, such as endogenous break tests and rolling window estimation (see Chevallier,
Le Pen and Sevi 2009 for an application of these techniques to study the eﬀects of options on
EU ETS futures).
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2008 2007 2006 2005
volumes (TWh) 233 221 197 203
liquidity (%) 69 67 60 63
avg. price (Eur/MWh) 86.99 70.99 74.75 58.59
std.dev./avg.price 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.22
operators with oﬀers 85 71 54 42
operators with bids 91 74 68 61
Enel share (%) 31 31 34 38
single-buyer share (%) 34 48 40 68
sales by source (%) natural gas n.a. 53.3 49.5 46.2
coal n.a. 8.2 8.4 9.0
oil n.a. 14.4 17.3 19.0
self-generation n.a. 10.1 9.7 8.8
hydropower n.a. 10.4 11.9 13.7
other renew. n.a. 3.5 3.3 3.2
Table 1: Time evolution of the Italian day-ahead market, 2005-2008 (source: GME Annual
Reports, various years).







D’Agostino-Pearson 0.8031 do not reject N
Shapiro-Wilk 0.9980 0.0273 do not reject N
Ljung-Box 5214.18 0.0000 reject white noise
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -5.389 0.0000 reject I(1)
Phillips-Perron -20.095 0.0000 reject I(1)
Table 2: Summary statistics and tests.
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Figure 2: Autocorrelogram of the IPEX average daily day-ahead price.
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Figure 3: Plot of the monthly time series of natural gas prices. Source: Ref.
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Mean
const 10.818∗∗ 3.560∗∗ -2.298∗ -3.654∗∗ -6.297∗∗
gas 0.574∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.179∗∗
β1 0.355∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.659∗∗ 0.698∗∗
β7 - 0.808∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.107∗∗
δ1 - 0.442∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.178∗∗
δ7 - -0.291∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.150∗∗
feb - - -1.111 -1.087 -0.418
mar - - -2.471∗∗ -1.945∗ -0.775
apr - - -3.501∗∗ -2.220∗∗ -2.332∗∗
may - - -2.896∗∗ -1.303 -0.101
jun - - -0.917 0.052 0.784
jul - - 0.174 0.445 0.225
aug - - -2.972∗∗ -2.490∗ -0.740
sep - - -2.281∗ -0.973 0.137
oct - - -2.438∗∗ -0.781 0.514
nov - - -1.997∗∗ -1.237 -0.789
dec - - -2.932∗∗ -2.937∗∗ -4.441∗∗
mon - - 22.858∗∗ 22.424∗∗ 24.712∗∗
tue - - 13.602∗∗ 13.500∗∗ 13.554∗∗
wed - - 11.404∗∗ 11.391∗∗ 11.462∗∗
thu - - 10.753∗∗ 10.767∗∗ 10.696∗∗
fri - - 9.908∗∗ 9.969∗∗ 10.180∗∗
sat - - -0.477 -0.295 -0.812
HI - - - 0.116∗ 0.062
HI2 - - - 0.016∗∗ 0.013∗∗
HI3 - - - 0.0003∗ 0.0003∗∗
Variance
σ 10.829∗∗ 7.750∗∗ 6.854∗∗ 6.811∗∗ -
ψ - - - - 0.151∗∗
θ - - - - 0.545∗∗
γ - - - - 0.749∗∗
κ1 - - - - 0.397∗∗
κ7 - - - - 0.154∗∗
∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
∗ signiﬁcant at the 95% level.
Table 3: Estimates of the time series models of Italian day-ahead power prices.
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(1) 11.37 9.28 12.16 9.82
(2) 9.30 7.29 11.44 9.14
Mean (3) 10.60 9.09 11.20 9.09
(4) 10.00 8.56 10.40 8.41
(5) 8.50 7.03 9.93 8.02
(1) 11.78 8.07 7.27 5.47
(2) 15.35 9.35 12.89 10.62
Variance (3) 30.35 26.77 7.02 6.09
(4) 19.47 16.29 3.84 3.39
(5) 12.90 11.09 3.37 3.63
Statistic Model RMSE92 MAE92 RMSE184 MAE184
(1) 12.73 10.08 12.90 10.26
(2) 12.22 9.58 12.68 10.00
Mean (3) 11.41 9.12 11.83 9.37
(4) 10.87 8.70 11.45 9.09
(5) 10.52 8.43 10.79 8.58
(1) 1.26 0.76 0.09 0.08
(2) 1.05 0.78 0.43 0.45
Variance (3) 1.37 0.96 0.36 0.28
(4) 0.75 0.60 0.32 0.27
(5) 1.13 0.58 1.57 0.69
Table 4: Forecasting performances of the baseline time series models.
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Andrea Petrella and Sandro SapioModels (3’) (4’) (5’) Models (3’) (4’) (5’)
Mean Variance
const -2.076 -2.775∗ -4.505∗∗ σ 7.618∗∗ 7.720∗∗ -
feb -0.744 -0.706 -0.947 σcfd -2.470∗∗ -2.606∗∗ -
mar -2.443∗∗ -2.007∗∗ -1.413 σtwc 0.684∗∗ 0.667∗∗ -
apr -3.592∗∗ -2.557∗∗ -3.127∗∗ σlib 2.473∗∗ 2.406∗∗ -
may -3.049∗∗ -1.762∗ -1.616 ψ - - -0.008
jun -1.208∗ -0.612 0.215 θ - - 1.883∗∗
jul 0.044 0.028 -0.095 θcfd - - -0.520∗∗
aug -3.003∗∗ -2.727∗∗ -1.762 θtwc - - 0.202∗∗
sep -2.221∗ -1.137 -0.607 θlib - - 0.383∗∗
oct -2.622∗∗ -1.146 0.017 γ - - 0.423∗∗
nov -2.008∗∗ -1.327∗ -1.500 κ1 - - 0.437∗∗
dec -2.750∗∗ -2.775∗∗ -4.763∗∗ κ7 - - 0.199∗∗
mon 23.619∗∗ 23.021∗∗ 23.807∗∗
tue 13.785∗∗ 13.775∗∗ 13.219∗∗
wed 11.617∗∗ 11.736∗∗ 11.548∗∗
thu 11.001∗∗ 11.132∗∗ 10.987∗∗
fri 10.243∗∗ 10.421∗∗ 10.066∗∗
sat -1.048 -0.699 -0.846
dcfd -0.287 -0.461 0.334
dtwc 0.721 1.047∗ 0.375
dlib 0.068 0.024 0.197
gas 0.177∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.179∗∗
HI - 0.124∗ 0.071
HI2 - 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗∗
HI3 - 0.0003∗ 0.0003∗∗
β1 0.690∗∗ 0.654∗∗ 0.655∗∗
β7 0.089∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.126∗∗
δ1 -0.206∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.104∗
δ7 0.165∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.157∗∗
∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
∗ signiﬁcant at the 95% level.
Table 5: Model estimates under changes in the market architecture.
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No PUN intended: A time series analysis of the Italian day-ahead electricity pricesStatistic Model RMSE7 MAE7 RMSE31 MAE31
(3’) 11.15 9.64 12.24 10.20
Mean (4’) 10.06 8.55 11.07 9.16
(5’) 8.59 7.11 10.98 9.10
(3’) 32.03 28.14 6.35 6.72
Variance (4’) 19.86 17.30 4.09 4.53
(5’) 11.42 9.02 4.98 5.20
Statistic Model RMSE92 MAE92 RMSE184 MAE184
(3’) 12.13 9.87 12.20 9.84
Mean (4’) 11.16 9.09 11.36 9.17
(5’) 11.38 9.31 11.42 9.28
(3’) 2.41 2.35 3.25 2.54
Variance (4’) 2.49 2.11 2.86 2.04
(5’) 7.65 5.83 8.84 6.08
Table 6: Forecasting performances of the time series models controlling for changes in the
market architecture.
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